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Abstract 
In this paper, I attempt to recover an 18th Century approach to 
moral theory that can be called Moral Taste Theory. Through 
an exploration of 18th Century sources I define the 
characteristics of moral taste theory and to distinguish it from 
its closest rival, moral sense theory. In general a moral taste 
theorist holds that moral judgments are analogous to aesthetic 
judgments while a moral sense theorist holds that moral 
judgments are analogous to physical sense perception. Francis 
Hutcheson was a paradigmatic moral sense theorist, but I 
argue that David Hume is best understood as a moral taste 
theorist. If we do not understand the concept of moral taste, 
we cannot understand 18th Century moral philosophy, and, 
more importantly, we will miss out on an important source of 
inspiration for 21st Century moral philosophy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n the 20th Century, David Hume’s moral theory was 
variously been interpreted as noncognitivism, quasi-
realism, and even common sense realism. It is perhaps 
more faithful to Hume’s own thought to categorize him as a 
moral taste theorist. Yet 21st Century moral theory has no 
such category. In this paper, I attempt to define the 
characteristics of moral taste theory and to distinguish it 
from its closest rival, moral sense theory. In the process, we 
will not only understand the 18th Century British Moralists 
a bit better, we will also see what the concept of taste has to 
add to any discussion of morality.   
 
To understand what moral taste theory is about, we begin 
with Hume himself. Hume opens his most mature work of 
moral philosophy, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles 
of Morals,i by addressing himself to the 18th Century 
debate between rationalism and sentimentalism: “There 
has been a controversy started of late much better worth 
examination, concerning the general foundation of morals; 
whether they be derived from reason, or from sentiment” 
(EPM 1.3). This debate, Hume says, is about whether we 
can “attain the knowledge of” moral distinctions “by a 
chain of argument and induction” or whether we must 
experience “an immediate feeling and finer internal sense” 
(ibid). As Hume characterizes it, what is at issue here is 
whether moral distinctions are logically necessary and 
hence “the same to every rational intelligent being” or 
whether they are logically contingent because “founded 
entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of the 
human species” (ibid). In the 20th Century historians 
called the former group moral rationalists and the latter 
group moral sentimentalists.  
 
I 
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Hume admits that he finds both sides “plausible” (EPM 
1.9). Both sides capture an essential element of the 
phenomenology of moral judgment. Rationalists point out 
that moral judgments are, in 20th Century terms, cognitive: 
moral judgments make claims about “what exists in the 
nature of things” (EPM 1.5), claims that might be either 
true or false.  Sentimentalists, on the other hand, point out 
that moral judgments are affective and conative: they are 
matters of feeling and desire. Rationalists argue that if 
morality were grounded only on “the standard of 
sentiment” then, like other sentiments such as judgments of 
beauty, morality would be noncognitive, merely a matter of 
“taste” and hence not susceptible to the kind of rational 
argument to which we standardly submit moral claims. 
“Truth is disputable; not taste”, claims the rationalist 
(ibid.). Sentimentalists reply that if morality were 
discovered by “the cool assent of the understanding” (EPM 
1.7), then morality would be nonconative, incapable of 
moving us to action and unable “to regulate our lives and 
actions” (EPM 1.8) as we expect it to. Hume concludes that 
both sides seem correct: moral judgments seem both 
cognitive and conative. Moral judgments are motives to 
action while simultaneously being capable of rational 
dispute. Hume says: “I am apt to suspect, they may, the one 
as well as the other, be solid and satisfactory, and that 
reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral 
determinations and conclusions” (EPM 1.9). 
 
Hume argues that since moral judgment “renders morality 
an active principle” (i.e., moral judgment moves us to 
action), then “it is probable” that “the final sentence” of 
moral deliberation is grounded in sentiment (ibid.). But 
that’s not the whole story. 
 
It is probable, I say, that this final sentence 
depends on some internal sense or feeling, 
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which nature has made universal in the 
whole species. For what else can have an 
influence of this nature? But in order to pave 
the way for such a sentiment, and give a 
proper discernment of its object, it is often 
necessary, we find, that much reasoning 
should precede, that nice distinctions be 
made, just conclusions drawn, distant 
comparisons formed, complicated relations 
examined, and general facts fixed and 
ascertained. (ibid.) 
 
Only passion and sentiment can move us to action, but we 
still need reason to help direct our sentiments toward the 
right objects. This point suggests to Hume an analogy with 
aesthetic judgment:  He says that “some species of beauty” 
are indeed indisputable as the rationalists say. 
 
Some species of beauty, especially the 
natural kinds, on their first appearance, 
command our affection and approbation; 
and where they fail of this effect, it is 
impossible for any reasoning to redress their 
influence, or adapt them better to our taste 
and sentiment. (ibid.) 
 
If someone disagrees with you about whether a particular tree 
or sunset is beautiful, it is hard to know what to say to them 
that could change their judgment. But not all beauty is beyond 
dispute in this way: “But in many orders of beauty, 
particularly those of the finer arts, it is requisite to employ 
much reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a 
false relish may frequently be corrected by argument and 
reflection” (ibid.). When it comes to art, there is a difference 
between good taste and bad taste, and rational discussion is 
capable of moving us from the latter to the former. And this is 
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the way moral judgment seems to work, too: “There are just 
grounds to conclude, that moral beauty partakes much of this 
latter species, and demands the assistance of our intellectual 
faculties, in order to give it a suitable influence on the human 
mind” (ibid.). Therefore the sentimentalists are right that 
action requires passion, but the rationalists are also right that 
moral judgment is disputable. 
 
Here the aesthetic concept of taste has allowed Hume to 
bridge the gap between reason and sentiment by showing 
how both are necessary. The “perception of beauty and 
deformity” is clearly based on our embodied human 
“constitution” (EPM 1.3). But we are not slaves to the 
whims of sentiment. Our taste in art can be educated—
“corrected by argument and reflection” until our taste is no 
longer “false” but has “a proper discernment of its object” 
(EPM 1.9). Hume concludes that morality works the same 
way such that moral goodness should be conceived as 
moral beauty and moral judgment should be conceived as 
moral taste. 
 
As a predecessor of his view that moral judgment is 
analogous to aesthetic judgment, Hume points to “the 
elegant Lord Shaftesbury” who, Hume says “adhered to the 
principles of the ancients” in seeing “morals as deriving 
their existence from taste and sentiment” (EPM 1.4). 
Sometimes Shaftesbury and Hume, along with Francis 
Hutcheson, are said to be part of a philosophical tradition 
called “moral sense theory”.ii I argue that this grouping is 
misleading. The term “moral sense theory” as applied to a 
tradition of moral epistemology whose main members are 
supposed to be Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume seems 
to be due primarily to the influence of D.D. Raphael.iii This 
is not to say that Raphael invented the term “moral sense”, 
but that he encouraged the use of that term to refer to a 
particular epistemological theory—a unified tradition or 
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philosophical school. This usage, I argue, obscures 
fundamental differences between Hutcheson on the one 
hand and Shaftesbury and Hume on the other. The latter 
two thinkers are better thought of as moral taste theorists; 
only Hutcheson was a moral sense theorist. In general a 
moral taste theorist holds that moral judgments are 
analogous to aesthetic judgments in that someone with 
good moral taste has the acquired ability to discern and 
appreciate morally relevant qualities through the skillful 
use of perceptual and rational faculties. A moral sense 
theorist, on the other hand, holds that moral judgments are 
analogous to physical sense perception in that certain 
information (viz., knowledge of the presence of moral 
properties) enters the mind immediately when attention is 
directed to the relevant objects. 
 
Before Raphael, there was some precedent for talking about 
“the moral sense theory”,iv but the more common term was 
L.A. Selby-Bigge’s “sentimentalist school”. Selby-Bigge 
does use the term “moral sense theory” in the introduction to 
his anthology British Moralists,v but he limits its application 
to Hutcheson, using the term “sentimental theory of the 
moral faculty” (in contrast to “intellectual theory of the 
moral faculty”) for the broader tradition. This is closer to the 
way the terms were used in the 18th Century. Adam Smith is 
one of the clearest thinkers on this point during the period. 
Smith is careful to distinguish Hutcheson’s “moral sense” 
theory which posits “a peculiar power of perception” from 
the theory that virtue is “recommended to us … by some 
other principle in human nature, such as a modification of 
sympathy, or the like” (TMS VII.i.4, p. 266). He calls the 
latter view “the theory of moral sentiments” and clearly has 
in mind as paradigm proponents of this view not only 
himself but also Hume, his contemporary and friend.vi While 
Hume does use the term “moral sense” in the heading of 
Treatise 3.1.2 “Moral distinctions deriv’d from a moral 
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sense”, this is not his preferred term.vii He only uses that 
term in one other place in the Treatise (T 3.3.1.25)—the 
very same section in which he says moral judgment 
“proceeds entirely from a moral taste, and from certain 
sentiments of pleasure and disgust” (T 3.3.1.15). By the time 
he wrote the second Enquiry, Hume is careful to avoid the 
misleading term “moral sense” altogether, using the more 
accurate term “moral sentiment” (as, for example, in the title 
to the first Appendix).  
 
Both Stephen Darwall and Michael Gill have warned us 
against the misleading nature of Selbe-Bigge’s sent-
imentalist/rationalist distinction.viii I suggest a similar 
wariness with regard to Raphael’s blanket use of the term 
“moral sense”. Writing after the advent of rational 
intuitionism, Raphael wanted to reassess the concept of an 
empirical faculty of moral sense with the agenda of 
demonstrating the superiority of a non-empirical faculty 
such as the one posited by intuitionists like G.E. Moore. In 
The Moral Sense he takes the issue in moral epistemology 
to be this: “When I judge that I ought to do a certain action, 
do I make this judgment on the basis of knowing, or of 
feeling, or of sensing something?” (p. 1). Later he makes 
clear that he recognizes only two alternatives in moral 
epistemology: “sense or feeling” on the one hand and 
“reason or knowledge” on the other (p. 2). If my arguments 
here are successful, then taste will emerge as a third 
alternative alongside reason and sense—a via media, in 
fact, to bridge the other two alternatives. In order to 
account for both the cognitive and conative aspects of 
moral judgment, there must be, as Hume puts it in the first 
Appendix to An Enquiry Concerning the Principals of 
Morals, “some internal taste or feeling, or whatever you 
may please to call it, which [both] distinguishes moral good 
and evil, and which embraces the one and rejects the other” 
(EPM Appx 1.20, my emphasis). 
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Since my distinction between moral taste theory and 
moral sense theory is not a standard distinction in the 
literature on the British Moralists, a few words of 
clarification are in order. In general, moral sense theory is 
the view that posits an innate faculty for detecting moral 
properties. There are three essential features of moral 
sense theory.ix First, the moral sense is a special faculty of 
the mind, usually conceived of as distinct from reason.x 
Second, the moral sense is instinctive. Just as all healthy 
human beings are born with senses of sight, hearing, etc., 
so human beings are born with a fully functioning moral 
sense. Far from being necessary, education generally hurts 
our ability to make correct moral judgments. For example, 
Hutcheson thinks that we would all naturally agree in our 
moral judgments except that some of us have received bad 
philosophical education thus corrupting our ability to 
understand what our moral sense is telling us.xi Third, and 
most importantly, the moral sense is cognitive and/or 
affective, but not conative. Like our other senses, the 
moral sense delivers information and feelings into the 
mind. We may or may not then feel a desire to pursue or 
avoid the object of our perception. But whether or not we 
do feel such a desire, that desire is distinct from the 
perception itself. 
 
Moral taste theory is the view that moral judgments are 
analogous to aesthetic judgments in that someone with 
good taste has the acquired skill of discerning and 
appreciating certain qualities. Hence to speak of moral taste 
is to imply the existence of moral beauty. Moral sense 
theory, on the other hand, may, but need not, involve such a 
commitment to moral beauty. Moral taste theory contrasts 
with moral sense theory in each of the three essential 
features mentioned above. First, judgments of moral taste 
make use of our ordinary perceptual and rational faculties; 
they do not require any special faculty of the mind. Second, 
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good moral taste is acquired, not instinctive. Good taste is 
the product of education. And third, the faculty of moral 
taste is simultaneously cognitive and conative, both 
detecting the presence of virtue and vice and motivating us 
to pursue or avoid them. The person with good moral taste 
is both good at knowing what to do and generally inclined 
toward doing the right thing—and these facts are both 
grounded in the same source in the moral taste. This last 
point will become clear as we explore the concept of taste 
in the next few pages. 
 
When we speak of “taste” in art or ethics, we are, of 
course, using a metaphor drawn from our physical ability 
to detect flavors of food. xii In its metaphorical use “taste” 
is primarily an aesthetic term referring to the faculty of 
discernment and appreciation of aesthetic properties.xiii 
When the metaphorical use of the term “taste” first rose to 
prominence in the 18th Century—the era George Dickie 
referred to as “the century of taste”xiv—it had a number of 
connotations all of which suggested some sort of 
evaluation involved in judgments of taste. The concept of 
taste was taken variously to have reference to objective 
value (as in “good taste”) and to have reference to 
subjective value (as in the phrase “a matter of taste”). This 
subjectivity could be taken individually or culturally as 
when writers of the period would refer, for example, to 
“European” or “modern tastes” in contrast to “Greek” or 
“ancient tastes”. (We will see below how the philosophers 
of taste might consistently affirm both the objectivity and 
the subjectivity of taste.) Moreover, to say that someone 
has, to use Hume’s term, a “delicate taste” is to ascribe a 
virtue to that person. A person with delicacy of taste has 
the valuable ability, analogous to a wine taster, to discern 
the presence of qualities unnoticed by other observers. 
The analogy with physical taste suggests evaluation in that 
physical taste is a universal faculty of human nature. If 
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taste is part of the natural human physiological or 
psychological makeup, then all properly functioning 
human beings have the faculty taste. In other words, since 
aesthetic taste is analogous to a physical sense, then 
blindness to aesthetic properties should be seen as no less 
a disability than literal, physical blindness. At the same 
time taste was standardly thought to be an educable 
faculty as seen in the locution “an acquired taste”. 
 
It may be difficult at first to understand how taste can be 
both objectively normative and subjectively relative. A full 
explication of this point is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Here let me suggest that the answer will have to do with 
intersubjectivity. To call something an intersubjective 
reality is to distinguish it both from objective and 
subjective reality. Something is objective if it is mind-
independent, i.e., if it exists independently of all mental 
representation. Something is subjective if it is individually 
mind-dependent, i.e., if it exists only in one person’s 
experience and is hence relative to that person’s individual 
point of view. Something is intersubjective if is collectively 
mind-dependent, i.e., if it exists in a group of people’s 
experience such that it is relative to what Hume will call a 
“common” or “general” point of view. Take, for example, 
the claim that a particular object is red. If this statement is 
interpreted as a claim to objective reality, then it means (on 
a Lockean analysis, updated according to current 
understandings of physics) that the object has an atomic 
structure that reflects light of a certain wavelength. An 
object’s color conceived thusly is something a blind person 
would be able to know if given certain facts about the 
object’s physical structure. But if the statement is 
interpreted as a claim to subjective reality, then it means 
that the speaker is having on this particular occasion a 
certain qualitative experience—regardless of whether 
anyone else (or even the same speaker at a different time) 
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would have that experience. This is an entirely private 
experience and is relative to the idiosyncrasies of the 
perceiver’s point of view. For example, the perceiver might 
be colorblind or be wearing rose-colored glasses. Finally if 
the statement is interpreted as a claim to intersubjective 
reality, then it means that the object would generate a 
certain qualitative experience in a perceiver under socio-
linguistically standard circumstances. In other words, 
anyone who uses the word “red” the way we do, has 
properly functioning perceptual faculties that operate the 
way ours do, is perceiving the object under lighting 
conditions we consider normal, etc. will judge this object to 
be red. 
 
On this scheme 18th Century rationalist John Balguy is 
giving an objective account of beauty when he says that 
“all Beauty, whether Moral or natural, is to be reckoned 
and reputed as a Species of Absolute Truth; as resulting 
from, or consisting in, the necessary Relations and 
unchangeable Congruities of ideas”.xv Most other 18th 
Century philosophers, however, thought of aesthetic 
judgments as qualitative experiences of pleasure. On our 
classification, then, taste would be for these philosophers 
either subjective or intersubjective. Hobbes is claiming that 
moral judgments are subjective when he writes that 
“whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; 
that is it, which he for his part calleth Good” so that the 
“words Good, Evil, and Contemptible, are ever used with 
relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing 
simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good 
and Evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects 
themselves” (Leviathan 1.6, p. 39).xvi Moral properties are 
not in the objects themselves but are in the individual’s 
mind relative to his or her desires.xvii Hutcheson and Hume 
are claiming that moral facts are intersubjective when each 
of them compares moral facts (in somewhat different ways) 
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to secondary qualities like color.xviii For these philosophers 
moral facts are not in an individual’s mind but are relative 
to a social practice of attributing moral qualities to things. 
If judgments of taste are intersubjective in this way, then 
they could be essentially subjective experiences while still 
having a normative standard which has a kind of objectivity 
in that it is not relative to any individual person’s thoughts, 
feelings, or desires. Moreover, cultural relativity could be 
explained with reference to various cultures’ different ways 
of specifying the intersubjective standard conditions of 
moral perception. In other words, we could affirm that 
moral judgment is a “matter of taste” without denying that 
there is such a thing as “good taste”—moral judgment 
would not be merely a matter of taste. Both moral sense 
theory and moral taste theory can appeal to the 
intersubjectivity of moral judgment, but they generally do 
so in significantly different ways. 
 
The last, and most important, connotation of the term 
“taste” is that taste is supposed to be a motivational faculty. 
As mentioned above, the analogy with taste implies a 
conative element. This is the key distinction between moral 
sense theories and moral taste theories. While the senses 
are often understood (especially by early modern British 
empiricists) as purely cognitive, the analogy with taste 
implies both cognitive and conative elements. Not only 
does good taste allow us to discern information about 
aesthetic properties, good taste is also a desire to 
experience those properties. The element of motivation 
comes out in the locution, used by both Shaftesbury and 
Hume, “to have a taste for X”. This locution is equivalent 
to a more common one: “to have a relish for X”. As the 
synonym “relish” suggests, to have a taste for something is 
to desire it, i.e., to be motivated to pursue it. 
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In 20th Century terms, moral sense theory is compatible 
with motivational externalism while moral taste theory is 
committed to motivational internalism. Internalism is the 
view that motivation is “internal” to moral judgment, a 
claim that needs explication. As a first approximation, let 
us say that internalism is a family of views each of which 
holds that there is (some sort of) necessary connection 
between moral properties (or facts) and an agent’s 
motivation. Externalism, then, is the family of views 
according to which any connection between morality and 
motivation is contingent.xix As they stand, these definitions 
are rather vague. To make them more precise, we need 
some help from distinctions drawn by Stephen Darwall. 
The above definition of internalism is broad enough to 
include the view that judging an action to be morally 
obligatory causes a motive to do it.  On this view, 
“although motive is in no way intrinsic to ethical facts 
themselves, it is a necessary consequence of perceiving or 
knowing them”.xx Knowing an ethical fact and being 
motivated to act on that knowledge always go together on 
this view, but this correlation is logically contingent. 
Knowledge and motivation remain distinct states of affairs. 
Most versions of the moral sense theory (including 
Hutcheson’s) fall into this category. But Darwall reserves 
the term internalism for views according to which having a 
(certain kind of) motive to do something is what its 
rightness consists in.  On this view “the existence of 
motive, perhaps of a certain kind or under certain 
circumstances, is (at least part of) what it is for a normative 
proposition to be true”.xxi The process of practical 
deliberation results in an unqualified motive, and the 
existence of that motive constitutes normative moral 
obligation. Only on the latter view is motivation truly 
internal to moral judgment, rather than simply 
accompanying moral judgment. And this is how moral taste 
theory conceives of moral judgment. According to moral 
How to Be a Moral Taste Theorist | McAteer 
 
18 
 
taste theory, engaging in moral judgment involves a 
process of aesthetic discrimination which, for the person of 
good moral taste, results in a motive to pursue or avoid a 
state of affairs, and that motivation itself is what constitutes 
the value of the state of affairs, because the morally 
beautiful action or character trait just is the action or trait 
which would be attractive to the person of good moral 
taste. Thus motivation is internal (in Darwall’s sense) to 
judgments of taste. 
 
To summarize the complex set of evaluational connotations 
which the term “taste” would suggest to contemporaries of 
Shaftesbury and Hume, aesthetic taste was thought to be: 
(1) an aesthetic faculty directed at beauty, whether of body 
or soul; (2) a naturalxxii faculty in analogy to physical taste; 
(3) a motivating faculty as in “having a taste (or relish) for 
X”; (4) an educable faculty as in “an acquired taste”; (5) a 
descriptively evaluable faculty as in “delicacy of taste” (6) 
a normatively evaluable faculty as in “good taste”; (7) a 
subjective faculty as in “a matter of taste”; (8) a culturally 
relative faculty as in “European tastes”. The general 
features of moral taste theory which allow these seemingly 
contradictory connotations to be made consistent are moral 
taste theory’s commitment to motivational internalism and 
the intersubjective theory of rationality. 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
i I say that EPM is Hume’s “final work of moral philosophy”, because, 
after writing EPM, Hume turned his attention, with the exception of 
revising Treatise Book 2 as A Dissertation on the Passions, to history 
and political theory. While Hume continued revising EPM the rest of 
his life, he never wrote a new work on ethics. 
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ii For a recent example of this view, see James Baille’s Hume on 
Morality (Routledge, 2000): “Philosophical taxonomists usually 
classify Hume as a moral sense theorist. This tradition originates with 
Lord Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury), 
although its influence on Hume came primarily from the writings of 
Francis Hutcheson” (p. 15-16). 
iii See Raphael’s The Moral Sense (Oxford University Press, 1947) and 
his anthology British Moralists (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).  
iv See James Bonar’s Moral Sense (Macmillan, 1930), p. 9 
v Selby-Bigge, L.A. British Moralists (Oxford University Press, 1897), 
Vol I, p. xlii 
vi The primary distinction Smith is making is whether moral judgments 
are made by a “peculiar faculty” or simply by our ordinary feelings and 
sentiments (TMS VII.iii.3.2-3, p. 321; cf. III.iv.5, p. 158). 
vii Hume seems to use the term “moral sense” interchangeably with 
terms such as, for example, “conscience, or a sense of morals” (T 
3.1.1.10), “sense of morality” (T 3.1.1.20), “sense of virtue” (T 
3.1.2.3), “sentiment of morality” (T 3.1.2.8), “sentiment of right and 
wrong” (T 3.2.2.23), “moral sentiments” (T 3.2.6.3), “sentiment of 
approbation” (T 3.2.6.4), “sentiments of virtue” (T 3.3.1.21), “taste in 
morals” (T 3.2.8.8n80), “moral taste” (T 3.3.1.15), etc. 
viii See Darwall’s The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’ 
(Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 20-1 and Gill’s “Shaftesbury’s 
Two Accounts of the Reason to Be Virtuous” in Journal of the History 
of Philosophy 38:4 (October, 2000), p. 529n1. 
ix Perhaps no single definition could capture the way all historians use 
the term “moral sense theory”, but I claim that my analysis here 
identifies three features common to the most widely used definitions of 
moral sense theory. I draw especially from Chapter 1 of D.D. Raphael’s 
The Moral Sense and Selby-Bigge’s Introduction to his anthology 
British Moralists. 
x Actually, the only reason the moral sense would have to be conceived 
as distinct from reason is if the moral sense theorist was committed to 
empiricism and wanted to avoid positing innate ideas of good and evil. 
Thus moral sense theory is closely related to rational intuitionism. 
Frankena suggests that intuitionism is the broader category that can be 
subdivided into rational intuitionism and moral sense theory, conceived 
as empirical intuitionism. See William Frankena, “Hutcheson’s Moral 
Sense Theory” Journal of the History of Ideas 16:3 (June 1955), p. 357. 
Raphael makes a similar suggestion The Moral Sense, p. 2-3. But one 
could just as easily say that moral sense theory is the broader category 
that should be subdivided into empirical moral sense theory and 
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rationalist moral sense theory (i.e., intuitionism). Mackie sees the 
distinction between intuitionism and moral sense theory in a slightly 
different way. He focuses on the question of whether our “faculty for 
drawing moral distinctions” detects “qualities” that are “objective” or 
“subjective”. See J.L. Mackie, Hume’s Moral Theory (Routledge, 
1980), p. 33. At one point he suggests that moral sense theory is the 
“subjective interpretation” of the analogy between moral judgment and 
perception, while intuitionism is the “objective” interpretation (p. 33). 
At another point he suggests that “moral sense” theory is the name of 
the genus whose “objectivist” species is “intuitionism” and whose 
subjectivist species is “sentimentalism” (p. 72).  
xi See Hutcheson Inquiry II.iv. Compare Inquiry I.vi in which 
Hutcheson claims that diversity in aesthetic judgment is entirely due to 
psychological associations that prevent us from having pure 
experiences of the objects in question. 
xii For a nice discussion of the metaphorical use of the term “taste” in 
philosophical aesthetics, see Carolyn Korsmeyer, Making Sense of 
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